Abstract: In this paper, the set of all physical theories is represented by a countable collection of consequence operators {S V N j | j ∈ IN} defined upon a language Σ. It is established that in the Grundlegend Structure, a nonstandard structure, there exists a function S such that for any natural-system representation W ⊂ Σ, S selects an ultralogic S such that {S
Introduction.
Seventy years ago, Tarski (1956, pp. 60-109) introduced the mathematical object called a consequence operator as a model for various aspects of deductive thought. There are two such mathematical theories investigated, the general and the finite consequence operators (Herrmann, 1987) . The finite consequence operators are usually the operators that model human thought processes that use but finite arguments and a finite collection of premises to arrive at a specific conclusion. Let L be a nonempty language, P be the power set operator and F the finite power set operator. Definition 1.1. A mapping C: P(L) → P(L) is a general consequence operator (or closure operator) if for each X, Y ∈ P(L) (i) X ⊂ C(X) = C(C(X)) ⊂ L; and if
(ii) X ⊂ Y, then C(X) ⊂ C(Y).
A consequence operator C defined on L is said to be finite (finitary, or algebraic) if it satisfies (iii) C(X) = {C(A) | A ∈ F (X)}. Remark 1.2. The above axioms (i), (ii), (iii) are not independent. Indeed, (i), (iii) imply (ii). Hence, the finite consequence operators defined on a specific language form a subset of the general operators.
Natural-systems are named and defined by scientific disciplines. Each is an arrangement of named physical objects that are so related or connected as to form an identifiable unity. Except for the most basic, natural-systems always require the existence of accepted natural laws or processes for, at least, two events to occur. It is required that a natural-system either be constructed by application of natural laws or processes from more fundamental physical objects (natural-systems); or that the natural-system is altered in its development by such natural laws or processes, in which case the natural-system itself may be considered as a more fundamental physical object.
Explicit statements for a natural law or process and the theories they yield are human inventions that imitate, in the words of Ferris (1979, p. 152) , intrinsic natural laws or processes that govern the workings of those portions of our universe that are comprehensible. Individuals apply various mental processes to a set of hypotheses that include a set of natural laws or processes and predict behavior for a natural-system. Mental processes are also applied to natural laws or processes in to order construct our material "man made universe." Consequence operators model such mental behavior. Indeed, these operators model many general mental processes not merely the standard notion termed "deduction."
Axiomatic consequence operators.
Prior to simplification, we need to assume that our consequence operators are axiomatic, where the axioms include appropriate natural laws or processes. Also, we need the fundamental philosophy of modern science that, with the exception of the accepted and most fundamental of physical objects, all named natural-systems are obtained by application of natural laws or processes to physical objects that are defined as more fundamental in character than the natural-systems of which they are constituents. Obviously, specified natural laws or processes alter specific natural-system behavior. As mentioned, the results in this paper are not restricted to what is usually termed as deduction. As done in Herrmann (1999, p. 12) , we only consider equivalent representatives as the members of L. (This is not the same notion as consequence operator logical equivalence.) Let C [resp. C f ] be the set of all general [resp. finite] consequence operators defined on L, where A ⊂ L is the set of logical axioms for F ∈ C [resp. C f ].
Although, usually, such consequence operators are considered as axiomatic, in this application the use of axiomless operators (Herrmann 1987, p. 3) leads to a significant simplification. For F ∈ C [resp.
The objects in F(A ∪ N) behave as if they are axioms for F. Can we use this axiomatic behavior to generate formally a specific consequence operator C, where C(∅) = ∅ and the only results displayed by this model are conclusions not members of F(A ∪ N)? If such a meaningful consequence operator exists, then this approach is acceptable since if natural laws or processes, as represented by N, are stated correctly, such as always including any physical circumstances that might restrict their application, then they behave like physical "tautologies" for our universe. For such a basic consequence operator F, the set F(∅) is composed of all of the restatements of N that are considered as "logically" equivalent, and all of the pure "logical" theorems.
In general, various forms of scientific argument are modeled by consequence operators, where the use of axioms is a general process not dependent upon the axioms used. The axioms are but inserted into an argument after which the actual rules of inference are applied that might yield some x ∈ L − F(∅). It is this x that may yield something not trivial. In the physical case, this x may represent some aspect of an actual physical object distinct from the natural laws or processes.
3. Rules that generate consequence operators.
In this investigation, the term "deduction" is broadly defined. Informally, the pre-axioms A ∪ N is a subset of our language L, where N represent natural laws or processes, and there exists a fixed finite set RI = {R 1 , . . . , R p } of n-ary relations (n ≥ 1) in L. It is possible that some of these R i are N dependent. It can be effectively decided when an x ∈ L is a member of A ∪ N or a member of any of the fixed 1-ary relations. Further, for any finite B ⊂ L and an (j +1)-ary R i ∈ RI, j > 1 and any f ∈ R i , it is always assumed that it can be effectively decided whether the k-th coordinate value f(k) ∈ B, k = 1, . . . , j. It is always assumed that a mental or equivalent activity called deduction from a set of hypotheses can be represented by a finite (partial) sequence of numbered (in order) steps b 1 , . . . , b m with the final step b m the conclusion of the deduction. All of these steps are considered as represented by objects from the language L. Any such representation is composed either of the zero step, indicating that there are no steps in the representation, or one or more steps with the last numbered step being some m > 0. In this inductive step-by-step construction, a basic rule used to construct this representation is the insertion rule. If the construction is at the step number m ≥ 0, then the insertion rule, I, is the "insertion of an hypothesis from X ⊂ L, or insertion of a member from the set A∪N, or the insertion of any member of any 1-ary relation, and denoting this insertion by the next step number." If the construction is at the step number m > 0, then the rules of inference, RI, are used to allow for an insertion of a member from L as a step number m + 1, in the following manner. For any (j + 1)-ary R i ∈ RI, 1 ≤ j, and any f ∈ R i , if f(k) ∈ {b 1 , . . . , b m }, k = 1, . . . , j, then f(j + 1) can be inserted as a step number m + 1. Note in particular how specific "choices" are an essential part of the process here termed as deduction. The deduction is constructed only from the rule of insertion or the rules of inference as here described.
It is not difficult to show that if you apply these procedures to obtain the final step as your deduction, then these procedures are modeled by a finite consequence operator. For the language L, a set of pre-axioms A ∪ N, a set RI and any X ⊂ L, define the set map C N , by letting C N (X) be the set of all members of L that can be obtained from X by "deduction." Clearly, by insertion X ⊂ C N (X). Since C N (X) ⊂ L, then we need to consider the result C N (C N (X)). Let x ∈ C N (C N (X)). By definition, x is the final step in a finite list {b i } of members from L. The steps in this finite "deduction" from which x ∈ L is obtained are the I steps, where we only added to this insertion members of C N (X), and the fixed RI. Suppose that b i ∈ C N (X) is any of these additional insertions. Simply construct a new finite sequence of steps by substituting for each such b i the finite sequence of steps from which b i is the final step in deducing that b i ∈ C N (X). The resulting finite collections of steps are then renumbered. The final step in this new finite deduction is x. Since the reasons for all of the steps is either the original I or RI, and RI contains predetermined n-ary relations that are not dependent upon any deduction, then the finite sequence obtained in this manner is a deduction for a member of C N (X). Hence, x ∈ C N (X). Consequently, C N (C N (X)) = C N (X). The finite requirement is obvious since there are only a finite number of steps in any deduction. Note that C N (∅) ⊃ B, where B is the set of all x ∈ L such that x is a step obtained only by the rule I. Throughout the remainder of this paper, it is assumed that all "deductions" follow these procedures and the corresponding consequence operator is defined as in this paragraph.
Intrinsic natural laws or processes.
For "scientific deduction" for a specific science-community, (i), we need to consider as our rules of inference a collection R i = RI of all of the "rules of inference used by this specific scientific-community and allowed by their scientific method" as they are applied to a specified language Σ i , the language for "their science." At present, this definition for R i is rather vague. Hence, the existence of such an R i is an assumption. Of course, as Σ i changes, so might the R i be altered. The R i can also change for other valid reasons. From this a specific "science" consequence operator S N i is generated for each set of pre-axioms A i ∪ N i , where A i are the basic logical axioms and N i the natural laws or processes. For proper application, the science consequence operator is applied to specific natural-systems, not those generally described. Thus S N i has physical meaning only when S N i is applied to an X where every member of X and S N i (X) is a "tagged" statement that identifies a specific natural-system (Herrmann, 1999) . In all that follows, we are working in a particular U i ⊂ Σ i of natural laws or processes that are accepted by a particular science-community at this particular moment of time and that are stated using the language Σ i .
The axiomatic consequence operator S N i : P(Σ i )) → P(Σ i ), where S N i (∅) ⊃ (A i ∪ N i ), can be reduced, formally, to an axiomless consequence operator on the language Σ i − S N i (A i ∪ N i ) as shown by Tarski (1930, p. 67) is the exact operator that, using implicitly such axioms as S N i (A i ∪ N i ), characterizes the coalescing of a given fundamental collection of named and tagged objects in X and that creates a different naturalsystem or that alters natural-system behavior. The use of axiomless consequence operators is a definite and useful simplification.
For any specifically stated nonempty sequentially represented collection V =
is a consequence operator defined on Σ i − S U i ( V) by the same Tarski Theorem 6 (1956, p. 67) . (The set IN is the natural numbers not including 0.) The family V may or may not be finite. In many cases, it is denumerably since to apply S V N ij to a specifically tagged description X certain parameters within the appropriate set of natural laws or processes must be specified so as to correspond to the specific X. We assume that the applicable set of natural laws or process {N ij } is the range of a sequence. This will not affect the conclusions since this yields that V can be finite or denumerable. Note that for some of the N nm and some tagged X ⊂ L to which the N nm either does not apply or does not alter, we would have that S V N nm (X) = X. For logical consistency, it is significant if there exists some type of unifying consequence operator that will unify the separate theories not only applied by a specific science-community (i), but within all of science.
An ultralogic unification for all physical theories.
Although all that follows can be restricted to a specific science-community, rather than consider such distinct science-communities, consider but one science community. Thus assume that we have one language for science Σ and one sequentially represented countable family of natural laws or processes N j . Further, there is one set of logical axioms A comprised of those logical axioms from each sciencecommunity and a combined collection of rules of inference that is used to generate a consequence operator for science. It is, of course, assumed that "science," in general, is a rational and logically consistent discipline, and that the theories predict correctly. Let sequential represented V = {A, {N j | j ∈ IN}}. This yields the sequentially represented countable set of all physical theories {S N i | j ∈ IN} and the countable set {S V N i | j ∈ IN} of intrinsic sequentially represented consequence operators. In what follows, we consider all of the previously defined notions but only with respect to this informal V and the language Σ. Now embed all of these informal results into the formal superstructure M = N , ∈, = as done in Herrmann (1987, p. 5; 1993, pp. 9-11) . Further, consider the usual * M = * N , ∈, = nonstandard and elementary extension of M which may be assumed for consistency with previous applications and possible further investigation to be a 2 |M| -saturated enlargement. Finally, consider the superstructure Y, the Grundlegend Structure (Herrmann, 1993, pp. 22-24) . We note that such a structure based upon the natural numbers appears adequate for our analysis since this investigation is only concerned with members of a denumerable language. However, if one wishes to include additional analysis, say with respect to the real numbers, then the Extended Grundlegend Structure (Herrmann, 1993, p. 70) can be utilized. The approach seems at first to be rather obvious. Simply consider an W ⊂ Σ. Then the result {S V N j (W) | j ∈ IN} is most certainly a unification for all of the physical science theories where each theory is represented by a S N j . However, in general, this union process does not yield a consequence operator (Herrmann, 1987, p. 4) . What is sought is a unification that generates each of the results S N j (W) and this generation is by means of a consequence operator.
Theorem 5.1. Given the language Σ, and the sequentially represented set of consequence operators {S
Then there exists a function S with domain D such that for each W ∈ P(Σ) there is a z ∈ D and a nonstandard consequence operator S(z) = S, an ultralogic, such that {S
Proof. In Herrmann (1987, p. 4) , a very special set of consequence operators is defined and shown to be closed under the union operator. For this application and for a given X ⊂ Σ, the set is H X = {C(Y, X) | Y ⊂ Σ}. Each of the consequence operators in H X is defined as follows: for each Z ⊂ Σ, C(Y, X)(Z) = Z∪Y, if Z∩X = ∅; and C(Y, X)(Z) = Z otherwise. The set H X is closed under the union operator in the following sense. Consider
Consider the entire set of intrinsic consequence operators {S
Define by induction, with respect to the sequentially represented {S } is sequentially represented, there is a fixed sequence g such that
(X). Hence for arbitrary X ⊂ Σ, utilizing g, the above inductive definition yields a sequence f X : IN → H X such that f X (j) = C j and f X (j)(X) = C j (X) and, as embedded into M, equation (*) holds.
Let X ⊂ Σ. Then the following sentence holds in M.
By *-transfer, the sentence
holds in * M. Due to our method of embedding and identification, expressions (2) can be re-expressed as
Next consider * f X : * IN → * H X and a fixed λ ∈ * IN − IN. Thus internal * f X (λ) ∈ * H X is a nonstandard consequence operator, an ultralogic, that satisfies statement (3). Hence, arbitrary j ∈ IN and w ∈ * g(j)(
However, under our special method for embedding
The final step is to vary the X ⊂ Σ and use the Axiom of Choice for the general set theory (Herrmann, 1993, p. 2) used to construct our Y. Since the X ⊂ Σ used above is arbitrary, the set of all such sequences f W , W ⊂ Σ, that satisfy statement (1) and, hence, the statements (2) and (3) when embedded into * M exists. Using the same type of notation for these sequences, the set D = {{ * f X (λ)} | X ⊂ Σ} exists. Then there exists a choice function S that, for the fixed λ, and any W ⊂ Σ selects the * f W (λ) = S. The conclusions follow by combining the above results and the proof is complete.
Note that usually W is a finite set. Assuming this case, then again due to our method of embedding
has had removed all of the steps that usually yield an infinite collection of results when S N i is applied to W. Thus, in most cases, S N i (W) is a finite set. Hence, if one assumes these two finite cases, then we further have that S
The choice function and the equation in Theorem 5.1 correspond to an ultralogic unification for all physical theories that describe natural world behavior when description W represents a natural-system. Such operators as S can be interpreted in distinct ways. If they are interpreted in a physical-like sense, then they operator in a region called the nonstandard physical world (Herrmann, 1989) , where W corresponds physically to the natural-system it describes. The restriction S( * W) ∩ Σ then represents a natural world entity. Indeed, S represents an intrinsic process that appears to guide the development of our universe and tends to verify the Louis de Broglie statement. " [T] he structure of the material universe has something in common with the laws that govern the workings of the human mind" (March, 1963, p. 143) .
6. Probability models.
In Herrmann (1999 Herrmann ( , 2001 , it is shown that given a specific probability theory for a specific source or natural-system described by a single sentence {G} that predicts that an event E will occur with probability p that there is an ultralogic P p that generates an exact sequence of such events the relative frequency of which will converge to p. It is also shown that the patterns produced by the frequency functions for statistical distributions that model natural-system behavior are also the results of applications of ultralogics. Although the main results in these papers state as part of the hypothesis that p is theory predicted, the results also hold if p or the distribution is obtained from but empirical evidence. Theorem 2 in Herrmann (1999 Herrmann ( , 2001 ) actually corresponds to Theorem 5.1. Notice that throughout Theorem 2 in Herrmann (1999 Herrmann ( ,2001 , the singleton set {G} can be replaced by any nonempty finite W ⊂ Σ and not only does this theorem still hold but so do the results on distributions.
Are these results for probability models consistent with Theorem 5.1? If probability models predict natural-system behavior, in any manner, then, in general, the natural laws or processes N that are assumed to lead to such behavior only include a statement that claims that the event sequences or distributions appear in the natural world to be "randomly" generated. It is precisely the results in Herrmann (1999 Herrmann ( , 2001 ) that show that in the nonstandard physical world such behavior need not be randomly obtained but can be specifically generated by ultralogics. These results are thus consistent since the ultralogics obtained from Theorem 2 neither correspond to nor apply to any nonstandard extension of the notion of standard "randomness."
